Peak Oilfield Services - Fuel Truck Driver Resume Example
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OIS - We are working hard to achieve our goals by using the latest technology. OIS - We believe that through our services add value to their valuable customer. In Oilfield Inspection Services we believe that, by ensuring optimum safety of your equipment, work place and competency of manpower, we are contributing to create a firm based and creative environment for your continuous improvement so we can be a part of the Omani society development process. We are working hard to achieve our goals by using the latest technology, competence, quality, neutrality and objectivity as pillars on which our company is built and by which we move closer to our customer.
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We have developed and introduced some of our testing equipment to support client day to day necessary Inspection requirement. We believe that the best investment we can do to ensure the optimum quality of our service is investing in people. That is why we are making sure that All of our inspectors are familiar with latest international standards and guidelines and have the practical competency to inspect equipment as per these guidelines on a daily basis.
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Support from management 3. In light of this evidence, the point at issue here is not whether a motorist who happens to see or merely run over an already existing roadway hazard can be found to have "created" the hazard.
Rather, Parnell's theory of the case presents a more limited question: In this unique situation, as we have noted, the crucial policy issue becomes whether the protective duty imposed by section should fall to both drivers based on their active participation and actual awareness of resulting danger, or just to the driver who, in retrospect, might be determined to be the primary cause of the hazard's existence.
In our view, the policies underlying section weigh heavily in favor of imposing the duty on both drivers. In arguing for a narrower interpretation of section , Peak relies on Udy v. Custer County, which simply recognizes the general principle that a motorist who passes by an existing roadway hazard owes no duty. In contrast, Parnell cites two cases that offer substantial guidance on this question: Leikvoll and Montgomery v.
On balance, considering the record, the parties' arguments, and these authorities, we conclude that when the combined actions of two actors result in a hazardous condition, section allows each to be treated as having "created" the hazard so long as each actor's conduct substantially contributed to the resulting hazard and each actor realizes the resulting danger of serious harm to others.
We also conclude that Parnell was entitled to an instruction to clarify the scope of the disputed duty. We have previously recognized that a plaintiff is generally entitled to a jury instruction "consonant with the theory of her case" if the evidence supports the plaintiff's theory. Here, Parnell's primary theory of liability against Peak was her theory of joint creation: In keeping with this theory, Parnell proposed an instruction describing her claim as being that "Marvin Dougherty struck a moose, thereby creating or participating in the creation of a hazardous situation.
In our view, by emphasizing that a duty of due care can be owed by a driver who either "creates" a hazard individually or "participates in the creation" with another driver, Parnell's proposed instruction effectively made the point that both Dougherty and John Doe could be found to have created the hazardous condition, even though the same hazard might have existed if only one or the other had struck down the moose. The trial court's instructions did not otherwise make this point.
In keeping with Peak's narrow view of section 's creation requirement, the instructions actually given by the trial court appeared to offer the jury an either-or choice: The jury may have understood these instructions to imply that only one actor could have legally created the hazard. The instructions effectively validated Peak's position that section 's creation requirement hinged on a finding that Dougherty was the but-for cause of the moose carcass's presence on the highway.
Peak maintained in its closing argument that the jury could find that Dougherty created the hazard only if Parnell proved that John Doe's vehicle had neither killed nor mortally wounded the moose. By contrast, although the instructions did not completely prevent Parnell from arguing joint creation, her attorney was constrained to confine this argument to the narrow theory that both drivers might have hit and killed the moose simultaneously a theory that would have required the jury to find that both drivers were the actual cause of the hazard because they killed the moose at the same moment.
Even when the jury later requested clarification of Instruction 23's final paragraph, which barred the jury from finding Peak negligent unless it found that Dougherty had himself created the hazard, the trial court declined Parnell's request to inform the jury that Dougherty could have created a hazard "either directly or in combination with another vehicle.
In determining whether the jury was properly instructed on the applicable law, we review the trial court's rulings de novo. Applying these principles, we conclude that if the jury instructions had made it clear that but-for causation is not a strict prerequisite to imposing a duty under section , the jury may have returned a different verdict. Accordingly, we hold that the failure to instruct the jury on Parnell's theory of the case amounted to reversible error; at a minimum, Parnell's proposed supplemental instruction should have been given in response to the jury's specific request to clarify the meaning of Instruction After the evidence closed at trial, Parnell unsuccessfully moved for a directed verdict and judgment notwithstanding the verdict on the same grounds or, alternatively, on the basis of the common law factors set out in D.
Parnell builds her theory of negligence per se around AS Baxter, we ruled that general traffic laws can "set the standard of a reasonable man and thereby require a finding of negligence in a tort action if the plaintiff can prove that the defendant committed an unexcused violation.
Here, the superior court ruled that Parnell's negligence per se claim failed to meet this standard, concluding that the requirements of AS State and Drahosh v. State, both of which describe the Alaska Motor Vehicle Code's hit-and-run provisions as having two basic purposes: Parnell contends that AS If the legislature had viewed roadway hazards as a matter of primary concern, there would have been no obvious reason for it to use the apparent value of property damage as the exclusive measure triggering the duty to report a hazard an imprecise measure that is bound to result in underreporting when low-damage accidents create obvious hazards and overreporting when high-damage accidents create no hazard.
None of the documents were introduced at trial to establish total property damage; indeed Parnell appears to have made no effort to pursue the issue at trial. And undisputed evidence established that virtually all of the damage from the collision occurred on the underside of Dougherty's truck an area where the damage was hardly "apparent. Thus, the court correctly ruled that liability on a theory of negligence per se cannot stand.
Parnell alternatively contends that the superior court erred in declining to find liability as a matter of law based on the policy factors listed in D. For this reason, we have observed in other cases that an analysis under D. Accordingly, this case provides no occasion to undertake an analysis under D. Peak raises a contingent cross-appeal, arguing two points of error to be considered only if Parnell's appeal is not affirmed. First, Peak challenges the superior court's order granting summary judgment to Parnell on the issue of Peak's vicarious liability for Dougherty's actions.
Peak emphasizes that Dougherty was not employed as a crew driver; the accident occurred before Dougherty's normal shift began and at a distance of several miles from the worksite; and Dougherty was not paid for this travel time to and from the jobsite.
Citing several cases holding that driving a company-owned vehicle does not necessarily bring an employee's conduct within the course of employment, Peak insists that the facts clearly show that Dougherty was using Peak's truck to further his own interests, not Peak's. Parnell responds that the superior court properly held that Peak would be vicariously liable if Dougherty were found negligent, because the undisputed facts show that Dougherty was essentially acting as a "bus driver" in furtherance of Peak's interests.
Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, an employer is liable for the negligent acts or omissions of an employee only if the acts or omissions occur within the course and scope of employment. Section describes the circumstances required to bring conduct within the scope of employment as well those establishing conduct fully outside that scope:. Section elaborates on the circumstances required under section and lists several factors relevant to determining their presence.
This section provides that, "[t]o be within the scope of the employment, conduct must be of the same general nature as that authorized, or incidental to the conduct authorized. Comment d of section specifically addresses driving that occurs while an employee is going to and from work:. While Peak did not pay Dougherty for driving other employees to the Swanson River worksite, it is undisputed that the company allowed Dougherty to have the truck with the understanding that he would use it to commute to the jobsite with his co-employees; it is further undisputed that Dougherty was en route to pick up other workers and drive them to the jobsite when he hit the moose, and that Peak authorized Dougherty to perform this task on a regular basis and derived a significant benefit from Dougherty's willingness to do so.
By driving other employees to work each day, Dougherty helped to ensure that they would reach Peak's remote jobsite on time, at the same time reducing traffic and related impacts on the gravel road leading to the jobsite.
As the superior court correctly recognized in applying the Restatement's analysis, these undisputed circumstances establish that, at the time of the accident, Dougherty was acting in the course of his employment with Peak.
Although Peak correctly points out that driving an employer-owned vehicle to work is not itself dispositive of the issue, the additional facts here clearly support a finding that Dougherty was acting within the scope of employment. We thus affirm the superior court's order granting summary judgment to Parnell on the issue of Peak's vicarious liability as Dougherty's employer. At trial Peak moved for an order allowing its accident reconstruction expert, Michael DiTallo, to supplement his pre-trial report with and then to testify about new information DiTallo had just gained from a recently identified witness.
The trial court denied Peak's motion. Peak now challenges this ruling, arguing that Peak acted diligently in acquiring the new information; that the evidence had significant value; and that its exclusion resulted in unwarranted prejudice to Peak. In response, Parnell argues that the court properly excluded DiTallo's supplemental report and testimony because the evidence was untimely and would have left her with insufficient opportunity to respond, since her own experts had already testified and left town.
We find it unnecessary to resolve this point on its merits. Parnell's objections to this evidence and the superior court's order declining to allow its admission both appear to have been based on concerns over potential prejudice that might arise if the new information were admitted at the last minute. Because the disputed evidence will not be cause for surprise in future proceedings, we see no reason to expect that the same concerns would prompt the superior court to exclude the evidence on remand.